[ul][li]Peercoin v0.5 protocol is under review this week. The protocol adjustment includes:[/li]
[li]Allow transaction output to have zero value, a requirement to support data transaction usage such as peermessage.[/li]
[li]Protocol adjustment to improve security.[/li]
[li]Expect further review and testing the following week.[/li][/ul]
Peercoin: v0.5 protocol adjustment
Allow transaction output value to be 0.
Use dynamic stake modifier for kernel generation
Protocol switch schedule:
Testnet switch - Nov 16, 2015
Mainnet switch - Mar 15, 2016
assuming that one controls large Sha256 Mining-facilities, would it be possible to attack Peercoin within those ~10 minutes that pass between two Proof-of-Stake blocks? What prevents 6 Proof-of-work blocks in sequence to be replaced by 7 secretly minded Proof-of-work blocks?
User Sakhan pointed me to a comment in your code, which mentions that Proof-of-work blocks are immediately checkpointed:
Does that prevent such an attack?
And don’t we need a solution that works without checkpoints?
A simple solution could be to require 6 Proof-of-Stake blocks for a transaction to confirm.