The coin age would be consumed as usual, and the reward (as if the coin age was its own minting stake) would go to the creator of the block, whether it is a minted or mined block. With this change, minting inflation would be roughly 1% of all minting and transacting coins per year, instead of just minting coins. Supply growth would still be limited by the 1% cap, but minters would have a greater reward and incentive to mint.
Another huge benefit is that this incentivizes minters to include all new transactions in each block, so that they can receive the minting reward of the associated coin age. Because fees are destroyed in Peercoin, the inherent fee-collecting motivation from Bitcoin is not present.
This, combined with cold wallet minting, could greatly increase minting participation.
While it may be attractive at first look it would lead to centralization and blockchain bloat.
—edit—
Let’s stretch some gray matter and post here why SK didn’t put that InDaKode?
Let’s stretch some gray matter, indeed. I think the idea has at least one problem: it makes mining a bit of a lottery. If your block is lucky enough to contain a lot of coin-age-destroyed transactions, you could mine a large bonus. In fact, large stakeholders could withhold “unlucky” POS blocks and wait for a “lucky” one, since it’s easier to just find another POS block if you have a large stake.
However, I don’t see how it would lead to either centralization or blockchain bloat.
Centralization is unlikely in the absence of cold wallet minting, since the pool owner could steal from customers easily. How does adding to a minted block’s reward lead to centralization?
The blockchain wouldn’t need to contain any additional transactions, because the coinbase transaction could just contain the additional reward as a single transaction (or am I wrong?). How does adding to the minted block’s reward lead to blockchain bloat?
kac, I think one of us is missing something. I think the answer to your question would be a minting pool, an exchange, or a centralized wallet service. However, I’m not sure how that relates to increasing the mining/minting reward as the OP describes.
I create a service where customers with large stake send me a signed transaction that moves their coins from one address to another, both of which only the customer controls. When I mint a block, I include this transaction, which destroys the customer’s coin age in my block. I get the customer’s reward, which I distribute back to the customer after keeping a small fee for the service. This saves the customer the need to mint his own block, but weakens the security of the network, because a lower percentage of total coins will now mint.
Yes, even further, you can offer a service for all users to make their txs not for free… they can earn by spend Who would win? Guy w/ slowest confirmation times = biggest stake. Biggest stake is biggest, earns most, stake goes huge, bank, beng, bong… aaaanddd it’s gone
[quote=“kac-, post:3, topic:2556”]While it may be attractive at first look it would lead to centralization and blockchain bloat.
—edit—
Let’s stretch some gray matter and post here why SK didn’t put that InDaKode?[/quote]
The proposal is basically creating a transaction fee and give the fee to the block finder. SK has said why he didn’t like the idea. If I remember it right, he said the 1% POS reward is already the reward to the minters so giving the tx fee is not needed.
I think the idea in the OP has its merit. Giving tx fees to the minters isn’t just tweaking the 1% number (the economic model). The problem with the 1% POS reward is that you get it regardless how often you mint. You are not directly rewarded for how much you have helped the network. However since you automatically aceess less tx fee if you mint less often, the total tx fee from all transactions packed in a block is directly connected to how much the block finder is helpling the network running.
If the main reason for minting is for keeping the network running, it would be natural to have the transactions pay the cost. POS is still needed because something that cannot be forged has to be consumed to keep the public ledger in order. It seems that using coin-age to find the block, like the way Peercoin operates now, but calculate the reward only from tx fees is the best way to align the contribution and the reward for running the network.
This is a radical change. There will be no automatic increase of money base due to POS. Peercoin would still be a highly efficient value store because the blockchain is made by POS blocks.
We should not mix up the transaction fee with the coinage consumption. My suggestion was about the coinage consumption.
I don’t know if I have fully understood. Let me explain kac-s objection in my own words: Let me be a big staker. I distribute my stake over two different hosts. If I have enough technical skill, I could move my asset from one address to another address, and the second host with enough matured stake creates the block for this, and gets the coinstake coinage as a reward. With enough skill, I even could try to force others big transactions to be put into my own block.
If I have not enough skill, I easiliy can pay and cooperate with somebody (the service), who has enough.
Again: in my proposal I wished other minters are getting the reward from consumed coinage of transactions. But this does not work, because shady people with enough technical skill will consume the coinage itself, and then make the final transaction to others (like exchanges) without noteworthy coinage.
There is an incentive to wait for fat[in coindays meaning] txs and mint blocks with them[either on main chain or on own fork]. But you don’t even have to fight for txs - you can create very simple service where ‘customers’ can post their rawtransactions and receive part of profits from destroyed coindays. Simply- why mint when you can spend? And which service to choose for such spending? The one with highest returns and fastest confirmations.
Customer has 365 coins which create 0.01 ‘coindays income’ daily, he can wait 3 days [0.03 income] and send them to himself using such TxService, paying 0.01 tx fee, 0.01 for TxService and taking 0.01 as pure profit from dummy tx.
[quote=“kac-, post:13, topic:2556”]There is an incentive to wait for fat[in coindays meaning] txs and mint blocks with them[either on main chain or on own fork]. But you don’t even have to fight for txs - you can create very simple service where ‘customers’ can post their rawtransactions and receive part of profits from destroyed coindays. Simply- why mint when you can spend? And which service to choose for such spending? The one with highest returns and fastest confirmations.
Customer has 365 coins which create 0.01 ‘coindays income’ daily, he can wait 3 days [0.03 income] and send them to himself using such TxService, paying 0.01 tx fee, 0.01 for TxService and taking 0.01 as pure profit from dummy tx.[/quote]
Yes, but this way I’m loosing the coinage for minting a block, so loosing the possible block minting reward.
[quote=“whifmoi, post:14, topic:2556”][quote=“kac-, post:13, topic:2556”]There is an incentive to wait for fat[in coindays meaning] txs and mint blocks with them[either on main chain or on own fork]. But you don’t even have to fight for txs - you can create very simple service where ‘customers’ can post their rawtransactions and receive part of profits from destroyed coindays. Simply- why mint when you can spend? And which service to choose for such spending? The one with highest returns and fastest confirmations.
Customer has 365 coins which create 0.01 ‘coindays income’ daily, he can wait 3 days [0.03 income] and send them to himself using such TxService, paying 0.01 tx fee, 0.01 for TxService and taking 0.01 as pure profit from dummy tx.[/quote]
Yes, but this way I’m loosing the coinage for minting a block, so loosing the possible block minting reward.[/quote]
I think kac- has found a legitimate problem. It’s true that the transactor would lose (not loose, haha) the opportunity to earn the bonus rewards from others’ transactions. However, I don’t know if that’s enough disincentive to keep stakeholders from using a service like this.
Now, I think there is probably a fatal flaw in the idea. However, there may be another way to accomplish this idea (from the same thread that OP links to):
[quote=“whifmoi, post:7, topic:516”]If technically possible, the interest could rise the more, the less PoS minters are active.
[tt]100% active minters -> 1% interest a year
50% active minters -> 2% interest a year
20% active minters -> 5% interest a year
10% active minters -> 10% interest a year
…[/tt]
The only possible way this perhaps could be applied would be to distribute destroyed coinage to active minters.[/quote]
Yes, I think so too. My idea can simply misused easily, so it is dead.
I wanted to give the more incentive for miners, the lesser of them are active. Also for keeping the security high, and for substitution of lost fees and coins. Perhaps somebody has an idea how to achieve this.
