Dynamic Fee Model?

Protocol
1

I gather there’s significant resistance within the leadership community to adopt a Bitcoin-style fee model, but I’m wondering if anyone can explain why.

If minting nodes prioritized transactions with the highest fees and minters received those fees for proving a block, it has a few benefits:

  1. It further incentivizes PoS participation.
  2. It’s not inflationary or deflationary (like the current fee is).
  3. The fee scales up and down with the real world exchange rate for the coin.

So what’s the issue? This seems like a far better design to me.

2

The fee is derived from the transaction size (0.01PPC/kB). The network will remain lean this way. This promotes decentralization and ensures reduced barriers to host a full node. Everyone should be able to run one if they wish. Most people refute and say “It’s (Insert Calendar Year here), Storage is cheap!”. Storage is cheap, but cheap is relative. If the fee became decoupled from the transaction size, then what tempers growth rate? Introducing competitive fee’s and decoupling the fee from transaction size would act against what is best for maintaining decentralization. Being able to host a full node is empowering. The destruction of the fee rewards every coin holder equally.

6 Likes
3

This already happens, but blocks aren’t full so block producers just include every txn in the block, no need for prioritization. As txn fees are currently less than $0.01, it seems obvious that we simply don’t have the traffic to create anything like a fee market. Maybe if you reduced fees to $0 you’d have full blocks, but I can almost guarantee that those txns would be trash, as people aren’t even willing to pay one cent to send them now.

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4

So if we had full blocks, how does the network decide which transactions get priority?

Ostensibly, the highest fees would still take priority, but there’s no incentive for the miners/minters to cooperate when the fee is burned. Couldn’t large nodes establish their own criteria for what transactions are included, creating maybe a secondary fee market?

5

Highest fees first (there is obvious incentive to want to destroy supply). Then, given a tie, highest coinage burned first (also incentive here for minters to want ppl to burn coinage)

6

Just want to cut in to make a remark that I do not believe that we’ll ever have full blocks.